Off the Map

The title says it all.

My recent explorations of general semantics have led me to understand its name (“general semantics”) means “general implications.”

Tracing its name back to the title of Alfred Korzybski’s first book on the topic, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, I recently figured that the name de-emphasized a subject more primary to the field: non-aristotelian (systems of) thinking.

For a rough synonym of “non-aristotelian,” think “modern scientific.”  That is, non-aristotelian thinking is largely just modern scientific thinking, especially when it comes to thinking about empirical reality and what is possible that we can know about it.

The “general semantics” part of the title suggests that the field also covers the general implications of adopting non-aristotelian thinking.  That is, the field of general semantics defines the term “non-aristotelian thinking” (rather, “non-aristotelianism”) and posits the implications of adopting it.

With this in mind, it seems to me that teaching a course in general semantics is not a matter of teaching language.  Instead, it is a matter of teaching thinking, specifically thinking of the non-aristotelian variety.  That means teaching modern scientific ideas: principles like non-identity, non-elementalism, uncertainty, and related principles.

Modern scientific ideas recognize that there exists a non-verbal reality, and verbal reality is something we add on top of it (so to speak).  The map-territory analogy famous from general semantics is mostly just a tool for helping a student of general semantics understand the importance of non-verbal reality and that verbal reality is not the same thing as non-verbal reality.  For example, we may use two words to split something up (like “mind” and “body”), when there may be no empirical, “territorial” support for doing so, their being so intertwined empirically that a clean verbal split misrepresents the reality.

This is to say that language is indeed an important discussion in general semantics, but what’s more important is thinking.  Non-aristotelian thinking suggests changes in how we talk about things, and thus changes in both the kinds of words we use and how we use our words.  In short, if science is supposed to represent reality, then non-aristotelian thinking does too, and so should the language of the non-aristotelian.

Where the abstracting process so famously discussed in general semantics fits in is within the discussion of non-verbal reality (as distinct from verbal reality).  Discussion of the extensional orientation (as distinct from the intensional orientation) correlates with this discussion.

How I see them of late, intension is just a special case of extension: an extension of a term is any referent for it, and an intension of a term is a verbal referent specifically.  That is, an extension of the word “cow” is that creature I’m pointing at in the field, and an intension of the word “cow” is the phrase “a milk-producing mammal often consumed commercially by humans.”  Because the phrase is a verbal referent for the word “cow,” it’s an intension for the term.  Korzybski advocated an extensional orientation, which is essentially the same as advocating a non-verbal orientation.  He also advocated an orientation toward “facts,” as opposed to one “of definition,” which is also essentially the same correlation.

I have a feeling the above is a lot of big, alienating words.  It’s okay.  Within general semantics there are some peculiar words whose meanings can be a bit elusive at first, but study in the field suggests that, well, they’re quite easily understood.  While Korzybski might not have been the best teacher in the world, he was a pretty darn good one.  He coined some terms for ideas not really yet formulated.  There were probably better ways to put things in general semantics (something I aim to do for you), but part of the fun is in the discovery of how simple some of his ideas are.

Like “non-aristotelian systems.”  That term refers specifically to systems of thinking.  And that line of thinking is of the modern scientific variety.  When you hear about general semantics, don’t think about language change so much.  Instead, think of modern scientific thinking.  Then think of the implications in your life, in culture, and in humanity were you to adopt modern scientific thinking as your way of processing empirical reality, also known as “the world.”

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Don’t let the title daunt you.  It should make sense in a bit.

Yesterday I wrote how typing up a passage by Edward MacNeal about “mathsemantics” led to the revelation that the name for my discipline, “general semantics,” is a generic term, one needing clarification.  I proposed that maybe the name should be “general semantics of non-aristotelian thinking,” and I explained that that phrase meant “general implications of non-aristotelian thinking.”  Calling my field “General Semantics” is a lot like calling it “General Implications.”  It makes you go, “Of what?”  Well, “general implications (semantics) of non-aristotelian thinking.”

That is, the field I’m in is really just the elaboration for the reader and practitioner what constitutes non-aristotelian thinking, what consistutes aristotelian thinking, and what is implied about the world we live in if we think more as a non-aristotelian (“more like a scientist”) than as an aristotelian (“more like what we commonly do”).

Now, I do a lot of my thinking in the shower (or rather, thoughts come to me then), and I was just in the shower when it came to me a new potential, imformative name of the field known by the name “general semantics.”  That name gelled with my exposition yesterday on what the word “semantics” denotes (“the study of what something means”), as well as the role the behavior of implication has in the field, especially considering Cassius Keyser’s friendship with general-semantics founder Alfred Korzybski, and considering Keyser’s own exposition of implication found in his breathtaking book, Mathematical Philosophy.  That name?

“Implicational psychology.”

That is, general semantics might better be named “implicational psychology.”  Well, what would that name mean?  It would mean, “the study of what things mean to us.”  The word “psychology” suggests the field pays special attention to thinking and thought processes of people, and the word “implicational” suggests the field pays especial attention on what things mean to people.  “What does 9/11 mean to you?”  “What does it mean to you when your husband forgets your anniversary?”  “What does it mean if the world is actually round?”  “What does it mean if the world is actually flat?”  “What does it mean if light speed is not infinite?”  And then: “What does the rest of things mean given those meanings to you?”

Now, to take Korzybski’s advice, I wouldn’t name the field with the word “psychology” but instead something more like “psycho-logics.”  For Korzybski, this word is better at denoting the empirically indivisible interrelation in the human body of emotion and thought.  Roughly speaking, the word “psychology” seems to imply “thinking” a bit more than it implies “emotion,” but “psycho-logics” (with its decided hyphen) seems to imply “emotion” (“psycho”) and “thinking” (“logics”) and their interrelationship much more clearly.  I might have Korzybski a bit wrong there, or I might misunderstand his exact reasoning for including the hyphen and making the word an “-ics,” but I think it’s something like that.  “Implicational psycho-logics,” at least as a name, better denotes the study of both what things mean emotionally to people, as well as what things mean intellectually to people.

I’ll say: “Take your pick.”  The term “implicational psychology” will probably mean more to a random person than “implicational psycho-logics.”  That is, from the perspective of implicational psychology, which studies things like “what things mean to people” (!), the field might recommend the former name over the latter.

I smile when I say that.

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The field of general semantics is strangely named, and it’s been my quest for some time to “make sense” of it.  Not having had the privilege of studying under Alfred Korzybski, I couldn’t ask him what was in his head when he coined the term.  I’ve long heard that it was a regrettable coinage, but I’ve never been one to regret much.  I prefer to use the term “general semantics,” especially since it’s been around for so long and that’s how the field had been identified.  But that doesn’t stop my continued effort to understand what Korzybski meant when he used the term.

A few minutes ago I was working on the new online store for the Institute of General Semantics (I’m their webmaster).  I was looking at a copy of Edward MacNeal’s book Mathsemantics, typing up its book flaps for copy for the item in the new store.  The flap (from the 1994 hardcover) had an innocuous passage in it that suddenly got me thinking.  First, the passage:

‘

Mathsemantics takes off from a quiz that was given to job applicants for the author’s consulting firm who described themselves as “good at numbers.”  Most of them, it turned out, weren’t in fact good at numbers, because they couldn’t draw conclusions about what the numbers meant.  The good news is that many people who think they’re terrible at numbers will find after reading this book that they aren’t so bad after all.  They’ll learn how to one-up the number crunchers.

The boldface was mine.  That part got me thinking: Is semantics to be construed as “the study of what things mean”?  Would mathsemantics be “the study of what numbers mean”?

Quickly I thought of general semantics.  I also thought of the title of Alfred Korzybski’s major work, which introduced the field: Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics.

That made me wonder if the term “general semantics” in the title is less the name of a field, but more a generic term relating to non-aristotelian systems.  (Huh?)  Let me rephrase:

Maybe general semantics is the study of what non-aristotelian systems mean?

That is, generally mean.  General semantics: the study of what non-aristotelian systems generally mean . . .

I really like that.  Especially that general semantics is the study of what non-aristotelian systems mean.  The term “general semantics” is just a generic term, a simple phrase (nothing special) … that took on the name of the important field that I dedicate a lot of my time and energy to.  Being named with a generic term would be like biology being instead named “Study,” or engineering instead being named “Making,” or my being born and named “Man”: Generic terms standing for very specific fields and things.

That’s what happened to general semantics, I’m believing here … it got stuck with the generic name “General Semantics” when it was something more specific: that is, non-aristotelianism, i.e., non-aristotelian thinking.  It might as well have been named “General Implications”–such a name would have been as equally empty and vague as the name “General Semantics.”

***

What does that say, “the study of what non-aristotelian systems mean”?  Well, it says that the field, at its core, is first an elaboration of non-aristotelian systems.  In layspeak, it’s an elaboration of modern scientific thinking that rivals the old non- and pseudoscientific thinking, say, pre-Francis Bacon, Galileo, et al.  Non-aristotelian systems are pretty much The Scientific Method and all of its related thinking.  The field first outlines that kind of thinking–that particular “system of thinking.”

The field, second, is an elaboration of what those non-aristotelian systems mean.  That is, the field of general semantics is secondarily an elaboration of what it means if, say, Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy is true.  (“Well, all of our knowledge is uncertain then!”)  It’s an elaboration of what it means if, say, Aristotle’s law of identity is rejected.  (“Well, no two things are ever identical with themselves, so change is always happening!”)

Tertiarily, perhaps, the field is a threat to aristotelian systems and aristotelian ways of thinking.  In layspeak, all those unscientific, pseudoscientific, and related overly simplistic and flat-out incorrect ways of thinking, particularly about empirical reality, are invalidated in light of non-aristotelian systems.  The system of thinking peculiar to non-aristotelianism spells conflict with those who think like aristotelians.  “It ain’t gonna be safe anymo’ to employ aristotelian thinking.”

***

In light of the above, it would seem to me that general semantics as a field should be clarified as “general semantics of non-aristotelian systems,” where “general semantics” just means “general implications (i.e., meanings).”  The field’s name just means “the study of the general implications of non-aristotelian thinking.”  That is, it refers to “the study of what non-aristotelian thinking implies (in general).”

Or even more succintly, general semantics could be renamed.  What about “non-aristotelian thinking” or just “non-aristotelianism” in order to cut to the core of the field?  The “general semantics” parts of the field are just later explorations of what happens if and when we take a non-aristotelian frame of mind.  First, we teach what non-aristotelianism is, and second, we teach you the potential implications of thinking that way.

Remember: From the perspective herein, semantics, generically worded, is the study of what something means.  Lexical semantics would be the study of what words mean.  Gestural semantics would be the study of what gestures mean.  General semantics?  Not the study of what generalities mean, but more like a study of what something generally means.  The word “mean” in this context refers to implications rather than denotations (what something stands for) and rather than emotional significance (“That has a lot of meaning to me”).  “Means” means “implies.”  So, generically speaking, general semantics are just a study of what something generally implies, and thinking of Korzybski’s work specifically, general semantics specifically is the study of what non-aristotelian thinking implies.

And implication connects with logics.  I refer you to Alfred Koryzbksi’s pal, the mathematical cognoscente and philosopher Cassius Keyser, for explorations in logics.  Keyser is especially great when it comes to teaching implication.  He’s my mind porn.  His book Mathematical Philosophy is beautiful, as is his coverage of Korzybski’s early ideas with respect to time-binding.  In Mathematical Philosophy Keyser expertly teaches the reader about implication.

So I feel as if I solved a mystery today.  The field seems to have taken on the name “general semantics” (a generic term) when maybe it should have been called “non-aristotelianism” (the specific term the generic term relates to).  And that formula has been spelled out in the title of the field’s foundational book since practically the beginning.

“Duh, Ben!”

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Today I write what I understand about general semantics (at least as Alfred Korzybski originated it).  Ask me tomorrow and I may have a different understanding!

My challenge here?  To summarize general semantics in just a few sentences.  Here goes.

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In order to develop a saner society, individuals must work on their personal sanity.  That requires work on themselves, particularly their thinking and thoughts.  What we call “thinking” and “thoughts” are basically electro-colloidal configurations in the brain.  What we call “unsanity” is presumably the result of trademark electro-colloidal configurations, which are manifest as habits and so-called “disturbance.”  By working on themselves, people can change their electro-colloidal configurations to allow what we call “sanity” to habitually manifest and “disturbance” to disappear.

In particular, work on the understanding of how reality presents itself to their nervous systems (that is, how reality re-presents* itself neurolinguistically in humans) and work at becoming more oriented with non-verbal reality as opposed to verbal reality (which we are more inclined to attend to) can make sizeable progress in rehabituating the unsane individual toward exhibiting sanity.  To aid their work at becoming saner, individuals can add to their speech a  collection of linguistic devices (known as “extensional devices”) that help them to become more oriented to non-verbal reality and less oriented to verbal reality.

The foreseeable result, which admittedly is difficult to achieve, of rehabituating individuals to become saner is a saner society, and even better, a saner humanity.

* I.e., “re-presents,” with a hyphen, in case your line break doesn’t make the hyphen evident.  This hyphen calls attention to the reader that representation is re-presentation (hyphen).  That is, when we are representing something, we are re-presenting it (hyphen), so there is a difference between the original presentation of something and the next presentation of it.  This is my take on Korzybski’s term “abstracting process,” which describes the path reality takes as we process it with our nervous systems.  Korzybski says that reality becomes more and more abstract as we process it; I might say instead that our nervous systems continually re-present reality (hyphen), such that we are never actually presented reality, only re-presentations of it (hyphen).

In this passage, the words in quotation marks I will call “undefined terms.”  Roughly speaking, they are labels for non-verbal reality, and it would be better for me to point to examples of things I call those words than to offer a verbal definition.

But here are some verbal definitions to guide your understanding.  Keep in mind, though, they are overly simple and not exact representations of the words’ referents:

thinking = a generic term representing many mental behaviors like contemplating, reasoning, wishing, etc., not to mention those mental behaviors like sensing, loving, hating, and other so-called “feelings.”  In general semantics, “thinking” and what is often call “feeling” are not seen as empirically divisible; they are so entangled that it is better to see them more as “thinking-feeling” than as separate processes.  Here, the word “thinking” refers both to those processes familiarly called “thinking” as well as those processes familiarly called “feeling.”  Korzybski refers to these processes as “psycho-logical,” intentionally putting in a hyphen in order to emphasize the interconnection of “feeling” (i.e., “psycho”) and “thinking” (i.e., “logical”).

thoughts = a generic term representing the relatively discrete products of the behavior of “thinking” (see “thinking” above).  That is, when we think, the products of our thinking we call “thoughts.”

unsanity = a generic term representing a range of “psychopathic” (i.e., personally destructive) and/or “sociopathic” (i.e., socially destructive) manifestations.  Admittedly, what constitutes “psychopathy” and “sociopathy” is relative to the interests of an individual and the interests of the individual’s society.  That is, what is unsane to one person may not be unsane to the next; what is unsane in one society may not be unsane in the next.  Generally speaking, what constitutes “unsanity” is a number of delusional behaviors that habitually interfere with an individual’s ability to live happily.

sanity = a generic term representing a range of “non-psychopathic” and/or “non-sociopathic” manifestations (see “unsanity” above).  Similarly, what constitutes “sanity” is relative to individual and social interests.  Generally speaking, it refers to the absence of delusional behaviors that interfere with an individual’s ability to live happily.

disturbance = a generic term representing a behavioral manifestation that is peculiar to the surrounding society, and particularly one that is “psychopathic” and/or “sociopathic” in nature.  Think of the familiar term “disturbed” for a sense of this word.  One line of thinking is that what constitutes “disturbance” may be the result of electro-colloidal configurations out of synch with natural electro-colloidal configurations genetic to the individual.  (Cf. No source; that might be my inference from reading general semantics.)

***

Now, could I summarize general semantics even more succintly?  Here is an even shorter, franker summary:

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Sanity is a habit.  If you want to get rid of your unsanity, you gotta work to rehabituate yourself.  Your personal work will make a better society.

It doesn’t say as much, but it’s something people don’t always think.  People often think they’re stuck with their thoughts, that they can’t do anything about them.  Well, seen as a habit, there’s the hope that the habits can be reconditioned.  But it’s not just “hope”: In my experience, it’s very possible.  I speak a lot differently as a result of the advice I took from general semantics, and I believe that I stand out as a much saner person as a result.

What might be a verbal definition of “general semantics,” in light of all of the above?  An even more succint summary?

‘

General semantics is sanity engineering.

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