The field of general semantics is strangely named, and it’s been my quest for some time to “make sense” of it. Not having had the privilege of studying under Alfred Korzybski, I couldn’t ask him what was in his head when he coined the term. I’ve long heard that it was a regrettable coinage, but I’ve never been one to regret much. I prefer to use the term “general semantics,” especially since it’s been around for so long and that’s how the field had been identified. But that doesn’t stop my continued effort to understand what Korzybski meant when he used the term.
A few minutes ago I was working on the new online store for the Institute of General Semantics (I’m their webmaster). I was looking at a copy of Edward MacNeal’s book Mathsemantics, typing up its book flaps for copy for the item in the new store. The flap (from the 1994 hardcover) had an innocuous passage in it that suddenly got me thinking. First, the passage:
‘Mathsemantics takes off from a quiz that was given to job applicants for the author’s consulting firm who described themselves as “good at numbers.” Most of them, it turned out, weren’t in fact good at numbers, because they couldn’t draw conclusions about what the numbers meant. The good news is that many people who think they’re terrible at numbers will find after reading this book that they aren’t so bad after all. They’ll learn how to one-up the number crunchers.
The boldface was mine. That part got me thinking: Is semantics to be construed as “the study of what things mean”? Would mathsemantics be “the study of what numbers mean”?
Quickly I thought of general semantics. I also thought of the title of Alfred Korzybski’s major work, which introduced the field: Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics.
That made me wonder if the term “general semantics” in the title is less the name of a field, but more a generic term relating to non-aristotelian systems. (Huh?) Let me rephrase:
Maybe general semantics is the study of what non-aristotelian systems mean?
That is, generally mean. General semantics: the study of what non-aristotelian systems generally mean . . .
I really like that. Especially that general semantics is the study of what non-aristotelian systems mean. The term “general semantics” is just a generic term, a simple phrase (nothing special) … that took on the name of the important field that I dedicate a lot of my time and energy to. Being named with a generic term would be like biology being instead named “Study,” or engineering instead being named “Making,” or my being born and named “Man”: Generic terms standing for very specific fields and things.
That’s what happened to general semantics, I’m believing here … it got stuck with the generic name “General Semantics” when it was something more specific: that is, non-aristotelianism, i.e., non-aristotelian thinking. It might as well have been named “General Implications”–such a name would have been as equally empty and vague as the name “General Semantics.”
***
What does that say, “the study of what non-aristotelian systems mean”? Well, it says that the field, at its core, is first an elaboration of non-aristotelian systems. In layspeak, it’s an elaboration of modern scientific thinking that rivals the old non- and pseudoscientific thinking, say, pre-Francis Bacon, Galileo, et al. Non-aristotelian systems are pretty much The Scientific Method and all of its related thinking. The field first outlines that kind of thinking–that particular “system of thinking.”
The field, second, is an elaboration of what those non-aristotelian systems mean. That is, the field of general semantics is secondarily an elaboration of what it means if, say, Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy is true. (“Well, all of our knowledge is uncertain then!”) It’s an elaboration of what it means if, say, Aristotle’s law of identity is rejected. (“Well, no two things are ever identical with themselves, so change is always happening!”)
Tertiarily, perhaps, the field is a threat to aristotelian systems and aristotelian ways of thinking. In layspeak, all those unscientific, pseudoscientific, and related overly simplistic and flat-out incorrect ways of thinking, particularly about empirical reality, are invalidated in light of non-aristotelian systems. The system of thinking peculiar to non-aristotelianism spells conflict with those who think like aristotelians. “It ain’t gonna be safe anymo’ to employ aristotelian thinking.”
***
In light of the above, it would seem to me that general semantics as a field should be clarified as “general semantics of non-aristotelian systems,” where “general semantics” just means “general implications (i.e., meanings).” The field’s name just means “the study of the general implications of non-aristotelian thinking.” That is, it refers to “the study of what non-aristotelian thinking implies (in general).”
Or even more succintly, general semantics could be renamed. What about “non-aristotelian thinking” or just “non-aristotelianism” in order to cut to the core of the field? The “general semantics” parts of the field are just later explorations of what happens if and when we take a non-aristotelian frame of mind. First, we teach what non-aristotelianism is, and second, we teach you the potential implications of thinking that way.
Remember: From the perspective herein, semantics, generically worded, is the study of what something means. Lexical semantics would be the study of what words mean. Gestural semantics would be the study of what gestures mean. General semantics? Not the study of what generalities mean, but more like a study of what something generally means. The word “mean” in this context refers to implications rather than denotations (what something stands for) and rather than emotional significance (“That has a lot of meaning to me”). “Means” means “implies.” So, generically speaking, general semantics are just a study of what something generally implies, and thinking of Korzybski’s work specifically, general semantics specifically is the study of what non-aristotelian thinking implies.
And implication connects with logics. I refer you to Alfred Koryzbksi’s pal, the mathematical cognoscente and philosopher Cassius Keyser, for explorations in logics. Keyser is especially great when it comes to teaching implication. He’s my mind porn. His book Mathematical Philosophy is beautiful, as is his coverage of Korzybski’s early ideas with respect to time-binding. In Mathematical Philosophy Keyser expertly teaches the reader about implication.
So I feel as if I solved a mystery today. The field seems to have taken on the name “general semantics” (a generic term) when maybe it should have been called “non-aristotelianism” (the specific term the generic term relates to). And that formula has been spelled out in the title of the field’s foundational book since practically the beginning.
“Duh, Ben!”
See also: alfred-korzybski, aristotelianism, cassius-keyser, definitions, edward-macneal, francis-bacon, galileo, generic-terms, implication, language-as-generic, mathematical-philosophy, mathsemantics, meaning, non-aristotelianism, semantics
August 19th, 2012
by Null-A « Think Different
[…] Null-A) Null-A Three ~ A.E. van Vogt Aristotelian and Non-Arestotelian Logic ~ Gotthard Günther An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems ~ Ben Hauck Fuzzy Thinking ~ Bart Kosko Non-Aristotelian Logic in Practice ~ Mike Alder (Excellent) […]
December 19th, 2013
by regina branham
You must not have read the book – perhaps just the inside flap. Korzybski repeats over and over that one should read the book at least twice front start to end without jumping around. He also states not to linger on areas you don’t at first understand and that by reading it several times it will all come together where at first it did not.
What his theory presents is that “man” has been using a language that is not based on “man-as-a-whole” but, rather a language that splits the “thought” process into “internal” (what takes place inside our skin” and “external” (that which takes place outside our skin” — and our nervous system in relation to that language does not allow a person to proceed to the full capability of what a man’s brain has potential and most men never get past the infantilism stage of development because our language prevents that. Language that is based on meanings given to an object are only a word that describes an object. It is ‘structure’ and logic when a sentence is broken down that reveals the truth of its meaning. Semantic reactions to the infinity of words that are used based on the speakers experience on the knowledge of that word is internal under his skin but is not what is true outside his skin compared to that experience of the other persons words meaning. Since dogs, rats, pigs, cows, monkeys can imitate and copy that which is observed by them is only that and has no emotional or experience attachment – whereas, man is not like a parrot that only copies what he hears – he, through his surroundings and also what his particular environment has shown him is how he perceives and reacts to semantics.
This is not the entire theory as it is difficult to explain in any short kind of way. You should read the book…..It really starts to make sense. I’m on the third reading and now it is coming to light and actually would stop conflicts, violence, institutionalized criminals, etc. It is very interesting.
December 19th, 2013
by Ben Hauck
The Author
Regina, apparent to me you have a good command of Korzybski’s writing and ideas. I’ve studied the book and GS for years; I’m unsure why you think I haven’t read the book. What in my post above leads you to say that?
The above post is part of a continuing goal to better, more succinctly capture general semantics-as-a-whole, and answer to my satisfaction why Korzybski landed on the name “general semantics” for the discipline. Hopefully that adds some context to who I “am” and what the above post implies.
August 12th, 2015
by Andy Hilgartner
I have read writings of Korzybski’s and of his closest colleagues (please don’t ask me for references, at this point in my lifespan) which state, simply and directly, that Korzybski coined the phrase _general semantics_ as an analogy or reference to the disparate ‘meanings’ of Einstein’s “restricted” Theory of Relativity (able to describe only bodies — or laboratories — moving very near the speed of light (so one has to use the Einstein-Lorenz Transformations), and traveling in straight-line trajectories at constant velocities, or “at rest” with respect to the ‘observer’ who makes measurements of such bodies or labs). As opposed to Einstein’s “general” Theory of Relativity (able to handle bodies or labs moving on curved trajectories as well as straight-line ones, and/or increasing or decreasing in velocity of travel (with respect to the ‘observer’) as well as at constant velocities). Korzybski saw the necessity, and possibilities, of such a phrase after he saw Lady Breal’s (correct name?) 1897 (correct date?) essay, “Sur le Semantiques” (correct name of essay? Spellings?). Her essay dealt with a branch of philology — the study of the meanings and/or derivations of words. So he called her approach “restricted semantics.” And he intended his “GENERAL” semantics to discuss — throw clarifying light on — (a) “how humans affect languaging (including ‘words’)” and
(b) “how languaging (including ‘words’) affects humans.”
Please notice – this ‘gloss’ of the term _general semantics_ unmistakably presents the topic as a _transactional_ relationship – one side (explanatory sentence) affects the other side, and vice versa. A “two-way street” – like your relationship with me, and mine with you.
Does this seem useful?