{"id":989,"date":"2010-12-23T12:39:45","date_gmt":"2010-12-23T17:39:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/?p=989"},"modified":"2010-12-24T10:11:08","modified_gmt":"2010-12-24T15:11:08","slug":"synonym-trees-and-korzybskis-structural-differential-or-a-generic-term-represents-a-number-of-subjects","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/2010\/12\/23\/synonym-trees-and-korzybskis-structural-differential-or-a-generic-term-represents-a-number-of-subjects\/","title":{"rendered":"Synonym Trees and Korzybski’s Structural Differential, or A Generic Term Represents a Number of Subjects"},"content":{"rendered":"

I explained in the previous post<\/a> that a generic term represents far fewer characteristics than what its subject actually has.\u00a0 As explained in this post, a generic term also represents a great number of subjects.\u00a0 This kind of stratefication of connection between subjects and the words used to represent them leads to the kind of imagery seen in Alfred Korzybski’s model, the Structural Differential.<\/p>\n

A generic term, by definition, represents a great number of subjects.\u00a0 Take for instance the generic term “thinking.”\u00a0 The word “thinking” stands for a lot of different mental behaviors.\u00a0 It stands for pondering, dreaming,\u00a0and hoping.\u00a0 It stands for postulating, hypothesizing, and theorizing.\u00a0 It stands for calculating, strategizing, and concentrating.\u00a0 It stands for searching.\u00a0 It stands for ruminating.\u00a0 It stands for a great number of other mental behaviors.<\/p>\n

That is, thinking is not some separate kind of mental behavior.\u00a0 Instead, it is a generic term (“thinking”) that stands for a great number of other mental behaviors.\u00a0 You won’t find thinking.\u00a0 Instead, you might find a number of behaviors we call<\/em> “thinking.”<\/p>\n

The stratefication comes when you think of a generic term like an umbrella, one which covers a great number of more specific terms.\u00a0 It’s hard to represent in text what I mean, but hopefully you’ll see what I’m getting at below:<\/p>\n

“t h i n k i n g”
\n\/\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 |\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\\\u00a0*
\npondering theorizing concentrating **<\/strong><\/p>\n

* (and so on with these branches)
\n** (and so on with these behaviors represented by the generic\u00a0word “thinking”)<\/p>\n

\u00a0There is a stratefication represented in the diagram–a hierarchy of sorts–wherein there are a lot of different behaviors listed on the bottom, and one word used to represent them all on top.<\/p>\n

What draws each of these behaviors together under a single word may be arbitrary, but usually it’s at least one characteristic, maybe a cluster of characteristics, that do so.\u00a0 In this case, the characteristic (or characteristics, depending on how you see this point) is that each of these processes take place centrally in the brain.\u00a0 Because they all share this characteristic, we call them “thinking.”\u00a0 Punching is not listed under “thinking,” nor is “gorilla” nor “Scent of a Woman<\/em>“–these don’t share the “thinking” characteristic.\u00a0 They’re each different things altogether.\u00a0 So we don’t call them “thinking.”<\/p>\n

Our diagram above has the word “thinking” pointing to actual behaviors.\u00a0 (You might not see that, but it’s what I intended.)\u00a0 But, of course, we can just stay verbal with our diagram, too.\u00a0 In order to do so, we would have to put the lower tier of words into quotation\u00a0 marks.\u00a0 This would distinguish them specifically as words.\u00a0 This would also make a synonym tree<\/em>:<\/p>\n

“t h i n k i n g”
\n\/\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 |\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\\\u00a0*
\n“pondering” “theorizing” “concentrating” **<\/strong><\/p>\n

What is the difference between the two diagrams?\u00a0 In the first, a generic term represents a number of things<\/em> (behaviors).\u00a0 In the second, a generic term represents a number of specific terms<\/em>.\u00a0 That is, the first has non-verbal referents, and the second has verbal referents.\u00a0 In some sense, the second tree is a special case of the first tree–it is the case where the non-verbal referents are, well, verbal<\/em>.\u00a0 Thesauri list verbal referents for generic terms.\u00a0 Picture books are probably a good representative for lists of non-verbal referents for generic terms.\u00a0 “[See photo.] This is a zebra.”<\/p>\n

So if synonyms only deal with words, then what would I call the first kind of tree, the non-verbal tree?\u00a0 Maybe a synothing<\/em> tree.<\/p>\n

But who cares really.\u00a0 What’s more important is to notice the stratefication, and that generic terms represent great numbers of subjects, and that generic terms refer to other things–they aren’t the things themselves.\u00a0 (That is, you won’t find thinking, but you might find pondering.)\u00a0 This all meshed together nicely with Alfred Korzybski’s Structural Differential, which he outlines in his major work, Science and Sanity<\/em><\/a>\u00a0<\/em>(currently for sale on the IGS website).<\/p>\n

In this video, Korzybski describes the Structural Differential:<\/p>\n

<\/embed><\/object><\/p>\n

What Korzybski doesn’t describe in the video is that you can invert the Structural Differential.\u00a0 By doing so, you get the synothing tree I outline up top.\u00a0 Each label could be thought of as a generic term.\u00a0 The labels more closely tied to the object level are more specific terms (“pondering,” “theorizing,” etc.)\u00a0 The object level would be non-verbal referents (pondering, theorizing, etc., i.e., the words without the quotes).\u00a0 The labels farther away from the object level are more generic terms.<\/p>\n

Here’re\u00a0some examples of Structural Differential chains employing my notion of generic terms:<\/p>\n

Object Level \/\/ 1st Label \/\/\u00a02nd Label \/\/\u00a03rd Label \/\/ etc.<\/span><\/strong>
\na snake \/\/ “snake” \/\/ “reptile” \/\/ “animal” \/\/ “lifeform” \/\/ etc.<\/p>\n

Object Level \/\/ 1st Label \/\/\u00a02nd Label \/\/\u00a03rd Label \/\/ etc.<\/span><\/strong>
\nBen Hauck \/\/ “Ben Hauck” \/\/ “actor” \/\/ “freeloader” \/\/ etc.<\/p>\n

Based on the second example, you can see where biases might show up inside one person’s scheme of generic terms (i.e., someone’s personal genus structure<\/em>).\u00a0 Someone appears to see actors as a specific kind of freeloader!<\/p>\n

In general semantics, each label is regarded as an abstraction.\u00a0 I’m arguing instead to call them generic terms.\u00a0 While it’s true to refer to them as abstractions, I feel that doing so is more confusing than to call them generic terms.\u00a0 Maybe better put: It’s less confusing to call them generic terms first, and see them as abstractions (“distortions”)\u00a0later, as demonstrated in my second chain where there is an obvious distortion.\u00a0 Putting the Structural Differential in terms of generic terms has helped me to better understand the higher levels of labels in the diagram.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I explained in the previous post that a generic term represents far fewer characteristics than what its subject actually has.\u00a0 As explained in this post, a generic term also represents a great number of subjects.\u00a0 This kind of stratefication of connection between subjects and the words used to represent them leads to the kind of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[94,244,128,236,247,69,240,245,77,242,243,207,241,246],"class_list":["post-989","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general-semantics","tag-alfred-korzybski","tag-behavior","tag-generic-terms","tag-language-as-generic","tag-non-verbal","tag-science-and-sanity","tag-specific-terms","tag-stratefication-of-meaning","tag-structural-differential","tag-synonym-tree","tag-synothing-tree","tag-thinking","tag-umbrella","tag-verbal"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/989","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=989"}],"version-history":[{"count":22,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/989\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1016,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/989\/revisions\/1016"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=989"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=989"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=989"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}