back then<\/sup> way of seeing words so there aren’t contradictions in what you’re saying.\u00a0 I’ll see if I can create one\u00a0 such paradox wherein the concept of terms-being-multiordinal clears up the paradox . . .<\/p>\nLet’s look at the process of abstracting as discussed in general semantics.\u00a0 It is a sequence of natural steps.\u00a0 First, there exists the event level.\u00a0 From the event level, we perceive something in our mind (i.e., mind-body), which manifests as an object.\u00a0 This object in our mind has notably fewer characteristics than its correspondent event-level existence.\u00a0 With that perception in mind, we recognize it as similar to a concept we have, which we label “apple.”\u00a0 This concept has fewer characteristics than the object apple in our perceptions, and far fewer characteristics than the event-level “thing.”\u00a0 We also have the concept we label “fruit,” which represents far fewer characteristics than the concept apple, the perception, and the event-level “thing.”\u00a0 So we are talking here in this process of abstracting about\u00a01 “thing”\u00a0plus 3\u00a0other resultant\u00a0“things.”<\/p>\n
We’ll call the product of each of these latter 3 steps “abstractions.”\u00a0 That is, the perception in our mind is an abstraction, the concept labeled “apple” is an abstraction, and the concept labeled “fruit” is an abstraction.\u00a0 If you take note, what the word “abstraction” represents here is three very different things.\u00a0 In one case, it represents something that will seem more or less concrete to us (the object).\u00a0 In another case, it represents something that is a bit more of a representation (the concept apple).\u00a0 And in the last case, it represents something that seems a bit more like a class (the concept fruit).\u00a0 It’s probably better not to qualitatively differentiate these abstractions like that,\u00a0but instead\u00a0to quanti<\/span>tatively differentiate them.\u00a0 So we might say that the perception represents or is composed of, say, 100,000 characteristics, the concept apple 1,000 characteristics, and the concept fruit 10 characteristics.\u00a0 The point is just to differentiate how different each of these things we call “abstraction” are.<\/p>\nIf we don’t differentiate the abstractions, we can run into problems.\u00a0 For example, we might try to make a blanket statement about abstractions, but find that it’s too hard to talk about perceptions in the same way as classes.\u00a0 The word “abstraction” is part of the problem because we use it for both of these different things.\u00a0 We practically act as if\u00a0a box\u00a0that contains 100,000 items is the same thing as a box that contains 10 items.\u00a0 It doesn’t take much processing to figure out that 100,000 items > 10 items<\/strong>.\u00a0 But when we talk, we\u00a0often don’t\u00a0make\u00a0these differentiations, so we end up with confusing identifications like a box that contains 100,000 items = a box that contains 10 items<\/strong>.\u00a0 We erroneously think, “The image in my head is (the same thing as)<\/em>\u00a0a fruit.”<\/p>\nHere is about where Korzybski’s notion of multiordinal terms comes in, in my opinion.\u00a0 Note that we are talking about steps in a process.\u00a0 There’s a 1st step, a 2nd step, and a 3rd step.\u00a0 “1st,” “2nd,” and “3rd” are referred to in mathematics as ordinal numbers<\/em>.\u00a0 Keeping that in mind, a multiordinal term would be a term that stands for each step\u00a0in a process.\u00a0 The term “abstraction” fits that definition of “multiordinal term”\u00a0well, because we call the product of the 1st step “an abstraction,” the product of the\u00a02nd step “an abstraction,” and the product of the 3rd step “an abstraction.”\u00a0 That is, we have a 1st abstraction, then a 2nd abstraction, then a 3rd abstraction.\u00a0 So “abstraction” would be a multiordinal term.\u00a0 The word “step” would also be a multiordinal term, because it stands for each point in the process.\u00a0 “Point,” too, would be multiordinal in this context.\u00a0 But returning to our example abstracting process,\u00a0the abstractions are\u00a0ordinally<\/em> different–both in when they happen in the sequence<\/em> of steps in the process of abstracting, as well as in the magnitude<\/em> of characteristics they represent.<\/p>\nIf we don’t call attention to the multiordinality of the term “abstraction,” we run into our problems when we start talking about abstractions.\u00a0 We want to see\u00a0all of these as “essentially the same!” when they are significantly different.\u00a0 However<\/em>, if we do<\/em> call attention to the multiordinality of the term “abstraction,” we can avert this problem.\u00a0 That is, if we cite, “The term ‘abstraction’ is multiordinal,” we are saying that “not all abstractions are the same,” that “in fact, they are different in ordinality,” that is, “they represent different orders of abstracting,” that is, “they represent different numbers of characteristics.”\u00a0 The perception represents an extraordinary number of characteristics, the concept apple represents few characteristics, the concept fruit represents far fewer.\u00a0 By citing upfront “The term ‘abstraction’ is multiordinal,” we make it clear that\u00a0though we call each “an abstraction,” these abstractions are ordinally different.<\/p>\nI hope that makes some sense to you.\u00a0 I’m basically giving you a new way to conceptualize some of the confusing words you hear and read.\u00a0 I’m teaching you to see some of them as multiordinal.\u00a0 But recognizing the multiordinality of particular terms, you realize that the things these words refer to\u00a0are inequatable.\u00a0 Just because I call a perception an abstraction and a word an abstraction, doesn’t mean I can\u00a0equate them.\u00a0\u00a0Equating multiordinal terms is like trying to\u00a0equate apples and appleseeds (or applesauce).\u00a0 Sure they’re all apples, but they’re ordinally different apples so they ain’t quite the same thing.<\/p>\n
This understanding of ordinality and multiordinality becomes important in understanding where Korzybski may have been breathtaken by Chwistek.\u00a0 I look now to Chwistek’s posthumously published\u00a0book The Limits of Science<\/em>.\u00a0 The Introduction to this book, written by Helen Charlotte Brodie, talks about Chwistek’s use of the term “semantics” (even the term “general semantics”!) when talking about order, expressions, and the concepts of reality.\u00a0 On page xlvi, Brodie writes:<\/p>\n‘<\/span><\/div>Chwistek’s position on questions of logical theory have influenced the formulation\u00a0 of his views on the problem of reality.\u00a0 He requires, for example, the acceptance of a theory of types prior to the formalization of reality.\u00a0 With the help of this theory he distinguishes an infinite number of meanings of the word “real” in addition to the four meanings already indicated.\u00a0 For there are formalizations of higher type which take formalizations of lower type as arguments.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Here we have the setup for a discussion of the term “real,” and how it may be a multiordinal term.\u00a0 Watch the next sentences Brodie writes, which spill over onto page xlvii:<\/p>\n
‘<\/span><\/div>However, this theory of types, which Chwistek called “metascientific”, is not formulated very precisely.\u00a0 Thus while Chwistek maintains that each of the four formalizations (i.e. each of the four “concepts of reality”), are of a different order although they are or the same type,[…] he nowhere sets up a precise hierarchy of orders.\u00a0 Nevertheless at very isolated points he does venture to make such comments as: the concept of physical reality is of higher order than the concept of natural reality […].<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
You start to get the sense that Chwistek sees with the word “real” a possible hierarchy of uses of the term.\u00a0 That is, some uses of the term “real”\u00a0mark a\u00a0higher rank or magnitude than other uses.\u00a0 Put another way, some uses of the term “real” ordinally differ from\u00a0other uses.\u00a0 The real similarity to korzybskian thought follows, as Brodie explains immediately after:<\/p>\n
‘<\/span><\/div>In spite of the lack of an explicit formulation of the “metascientific” theory of types this theory is of use in resolving some of the epistemological puzzles raised in connection with dreams.\u00a0 Chwistek maintains, for example, that it is not an error for an individual to regard his dreams as “real”.\u00a0 Dreams are just as “real” as are persons or things.\u00a0 They are merely of a different order.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Shabam.<\/em>\u00a0 According to Brodie, Chwistek says that different uses of term “real”–or put another way, some concepts labeled “real”–may differ ordinally.\u00a0 In this way, a dream can be real but so can something else–just as long as we recognize that “real” is a multiordinal term, that is, it stands for concepts of different orders.<\/p>\nBrodie continues, bolding mine:<\/p>\n
‘<\/span><\/div>On the other hand, it would be wrong for an indivdual to regard the sensation which he experiences when he is dreaming as sensations of the same type as those which he experiences when he is awake.\u00a0 Chwistek’s contribution to philosophical theory thus rests on the method he has devised by which it is possible to obtain precision in philosophical concepts<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\nOr as I understand this passage, Chwistek made it possible to conceptualize hierarchically different uses of a particular term.\u00a0 Just because we call two different things “abstractions” doesn’t mean we can treat them as the same.\u00a0 The same with things called “real”: Just because we call two different things “real” doesn’t mean we can treat them the same.\u00a0 Both dreams and perceptions are real, but though we call them “real” doesn’t mean they’re the same real, though they may be a related kind of real.\u00a0\u00a0The word “real”\u00a0is a\u00a0multiordinal term, with each appearance potentially standing for hierarchically different ideas than in other appearances.\u00a0 The same with the word “abstraction.”\u00a0 Another way to think about multiordinal terms would be to look at the price tag on a toy and on a house.\u00a0 Both may say “Sale” on their tags, but the magnitudes represented by each appearance of the term\u00a0are extraordinarily different.\u00a0 A toy sale is ordinally different from a house sale, at least in terms of the discount being offered.<\/p>\n
All in all, Korzybski’s term “multiordinal terms” is just a nice conceptual device for realizing that not all abstractions are alike, not all yeses are alike, not all trues, falses, definitions, etc., are alike.\u00a0 They may be ordinally different.\u00a0 A definition of an object is not necessarily the same thing as a definition of a term–the term “definition” stands for ordinally different behaviors.\u00a0 At least this is how I’ve understood multiordinal terms for a while, coming more to a head in this blog post.<\/p>\n
While I have your attention on Brodie, I’ll include one last passage from page xlvii found in the second\u00a0footnote, which deals specifically with Chwistek’s use of the term “general semantics”:<\/p>\n
‘<\/span><\/div>In his consideration of the problem of reality Chwistek has on occasion alluded to general semantics (as distinct from rational semantics) and seems to suggest its importance in dealing with the problem of reality.\u00a0 He does not, however, specify exactly what he understands by the term “general semantics” and always returns to rational semantics, the system of semantics developed at length in this book, for hints to be applied in resolving the problem.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Brodie’s passage communicates two things to me: One, that Chwistek coined the term “general semantics” to differentiate something from rational semantics, and two, that semantics has something to do with meaning and the ordinality of terms.\u00a0 (I would imagine that Korzybski was inspired by<\/em> Chwistek in naming the field “general semantics,” rather than indebting himself to Chwistek as the namer of the field.)<\/p>\nAt this point, it’s seeming to me that the term “general semantics” means something really quite specific: that some words, though they seem similar, are ordinally different, and it is this fact that we are driving home in the field of general semantics<\/em>.\u00a0 Put another way: though two things are called the same thing, the meanings of those words may be different, because what they represent may differ ordinally (in sequence or in magnitude)<\/em>.\u00a0 Saying the term “general semantics” is almost like saying “general insights related to the meaning of terms, especially in terms of multiordinality.”\u00a0 General semantics is general commentary on meaning<\/em>, or general commentary with respect to meaning<\/em>, or general commentary related to meaning<\/em>.<\/p>\nAs a brief sidebar before continuing, it should be noted that multiordinality and multi-meaning are different concepts that are often confused.\u00a0 Multi-meaning is just the concept of having more than one possible meaning for a term.\u00a0 The term “pen” would be a good example of that, when you think of the writing implement and the place where a pig lives.\u00a0 Multiordinality is the concept of a term’s representational magnitude.\u00a0 One use of the word “abstraction” may represent a higher magnitude of characteristics than another use of the word “abstraction.”\u00a0 The word “abstraction” is said to be a multiordinal term for that reason (I argue).\u00a0 In some places in general semantics literature you’ll find a basic confusion (equation) of multiordinality and multi-meaning.\u00a0 Myself and others would disagree with that characterization.<\/p>\n
Now back to Korzybski.\u00a0 We return to Science and Sanity<\/em> to see how some of the above notions match up.\u00a0\u00a0For now we’ll\u00a0look for other mentions of Chwistek in the book.\u00a0 We find a passage on page 748 which seems to be about sorting out issues in mathematics a little better.\u00a0 It reads:<\/p>\n‘<\/span><\/div>The restricted semantic<\/em> school represented by Chwistek and his pupils, which is characterized mostly by the semantic approach, and by paying special attention to the number<\/em> of values, establishing the thesis that the older ‘freedom from contradictions’ depends on one-valued formulations, as discovered by Skarzenski [accents in his name\u00a0omitted] and quoted by Chwistek.<\/p><\/blockquote>\nI’m not sure if I know what Korzybski is talking about here.\u00a0 In The Limits of Science<\/em>, Chwistek has one reference to Skarzenski as the prover of a theorem (see page 87), but The Limits of Science<\/em> wasn’t even published by the time Science and Sanity<\/em> was published.\u00a0 I’m left at a bit of a dead end here about Skarzenski but I’ll just assume based on Korzybski’s phraseology, he didn’t look at any Skarzenski.\u00a0 (I can’t validate or invalidate\u00a0that claim right now.)<\/p>\nSo I guess I have to do some guessing about what Korzybski meant in that passage.\u00a0 I suppose “the semantic approach” is just an approach at looking at what something might mean as opposed to looking at something else.\u00a0 Why Korzybski decided to name his field “general semantics” is a little beyond me still, but my hypothesis based on all of the above blog entry is that he felt his insights were related to the meanings of words, a general structural commentary on how people use language, that just because they use the same word for different things doesn’t mean those things are equatable.\u00a0 Korzybski is conceptualizing meaning, talking about the structure of our meanings or the framework in which it lives, rather than talking about\u00a0the content of our\u00a0meanings\u00a0(the subject of historical semantics).<\/p>\n
Wait.\u00a0 Aha.\u00a0 I think I just figured out something.\u00a0 The index of subjects for Chwistek’s The Limits of Science<\/em> has the entry “‘Semantics’ (syntax),” suggesting that within the discourse of Chwistek, the word\u00a0“semantics” refers to syntax.\u00a0 This is interesting because traditionally, “semantics” does not<\/em> refer to syntax.\u00a0 Very generally, syntax may be thought of as the structure of a particular expression.\u00a0 This is to say, could it be?, that Korzybski’s term “general semantics” has a similarly different use of the term “semantics”?<\/p>\nIf so, this is what I’ll argue for why Korzybski called it “general semantics”: For Korzybski–from Chwistek–the word “semantics” refers not to the content of language, but to the structure<\/em> of language.\u00a0 Both the content and the structure of language are meaningful; that is, they can communicate to the listener.\u00a0 But rather than paying attention to what was said in an expression, Korzybski was interested more\u00a0in the structure of the expression and what that structure communicates.\u00a0 Using our box with 100,000 items example, let’s imagine hearing an expression\u00a0like receiving this box full of items.\u00a0 Instead of being interested in the items he received, Korzybski was interested in the box he received<\/em>.\u00a0 How was the box put together?\u00a0 What was its shape?\u00a0 What is the design of the box?\u00a0 How does the design of the box affect the recipient?\u00a0 Does it hold the items well?\u00a0 Etc.\u00a0 (Given these questions, terms of a multiordinal character might be said to be designed poorly when their multiordinality is not called out because otherwise they make discourse confusing, with rampant, inappropriate identifications.)<\/p>\nThe box analogy is\u00a0not Korzybski’s, but mine.\u00a0 It is seems to gel well with what I know of general semantics.\u00a0 Korzybski chants in Science and Sanity<\/em> about the importance of structure, but it never occurred to me that the word “semantics” could be\u00a0referring specifically to\u00a0the structure of language<\/em>.\u00a0 “Semantics” only ever seemed to me to refer to the content of language<\/em>.\u00a0 In seeing how Chwistek uses the term “semantics,” and in noting Korzybski’s citation of Chwistek as one of the main reasons for his use of the term “general semantics,” I see a coincident interest in structure between the two authors, and from this, it seems to me that Korzybski called his field “general semantics” in the sense of “general commentary on the structure of language (as opposed to the content of language)<\/strong>.”\u00a0 This reasoning spells almost exactly why Korzybski was so interested in perception, abstracting, orders of abstraction, the map-territory analogy for understanding language and its relationship with reality (actuality), the subject-predicate form, multiordinal terms, extensional devices, etc.\u00a0 They were all related to the structure of language in some way or another.<\/p>\nWe connect this all back to human engineering and the notion of time-binding Korzybski presents in his book Manhood of Humanity<\/em>.\u00a0 With the refinements of the concept that Cassius Keyser and Walter Polakov present in their respective works, time-binding is understood as the cooperation between dead people and living people for the purpose of production<\/em>.\u00a0 That cooperation is facilitated almost primarily via the language the dead people produce for the living people to later read or listen to.\u00a0 The content of those communications is important, but so is the structure of those communications.\u00a0 In fact, the structure of those communications may be more<\/em> important than the content, Korzybski might argue.\u00a0 It might be that the structure of language is a greater threat to production than the content of language, because the structure of language tends\u00a0 to, or up until Korzybski has tended to, go unscrutinized.<\/p>\nAnd this is the concern of general semantics: the structure of language, for the fear that it may hinder human\u00a0production if we don’t address it.\u00a0 General semantics is the study of the structure of language and its effects on human production.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"I don’t read Polish. This fact frustrates me to an extent, because it has seemed almost certain to me that for me to understand why Alfred Korzybski called his\u00a0field “general semantics,” I have to read the writings of Polish logician Leon Chwistek.\u00a0 Or maybe I have to read a bit of German, because the reason […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[36,9,40,6,41,42,29],"class_list":["post-342","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general-semantics","tag-cassius-keyser","tag-definition","tag-leon-chwistek","tag-marketing","tag-multiordinality","tag-structure","tag-walter-polakov"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/342","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=342"}],"version-history":[{"count":87,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/342\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1228,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/342\/revisions\/1228"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=342"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=342"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=342"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}