Age old is probably the question that is the title for this post.\u00a0 Despite its age, I haven’t wrestled with the question very much.\u00a0 However, I find an interest in it as I’ve zeroed in on a marketable definition of general semantics.\u00a0 In crafting a definition that really works, it casts new light on the label for the field and what its emphasis might be.\u00a0 In light of that emphasis, you start to wonder if there’s a better term for the field …<\/p>\n
I won’t go into some of the old candidates proposed for a new name, and instead just stick to some of my ideas.\u00a0 As a starter, I’ll use my latest definition of general semantics, outlined in this post<\/a>:<\/p>\n General semantics is the study of thinking and its effects on behavior, culture, and humanity.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Shortened, you realize that general semantics is a study of thinking at its very root. Thus, the term “cognitive science” might be a nice term to use in its place, were it not already its own field.\u00a0 Dictionary.com\u00a0defines “cognitive science”<\/a> as:<\/p>\n the study of the precise nature of different mental tasks and the operations of the brain that enable them to be performed, engaging branches of psychology, computer science, philosophy, and linguistics.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n This defintion puts general semantics generally within the field of cognitive science.\u00a0 The only problem is that at times general semantics is a bit more editorial than scientific.\u00a0 That is, rather than relying exclusively on evidence built up through scientific investigation as support for its claims, sometimes it relies on argued opinions for its claims.\u00a0 My blog is the kind of support one might use in general semantics, considering that my claims aren’t rooted in the scientific method.<\/p>\n So, in that sense, the term “cognitive science” might be a bit too limiting an alternate\u00a0term for general semantics, as general semantics might need something encompassing of it as scientific study as well as an editorial study.\u00a0 Words ending in “-ology” start to come to mind, as that suffix generally means something to the effect of “the study of.”\u00a0 If we’re talking about the study of thinking, the word “mental” comes to, um, mind.\u00a0 “Mental” means “of or related to the mind,” and if you know from my published essay on the group mind, the word “mind” is a reification of the behavior of thinking.\u00a0 So, just as much as “mental” means “of or related to the mind,” it means “of or related to thinking.”\u00a0 We might try to rename general semantics, then, as mentology<\/em>.<\/p>\n “Mentology” could be a nice term.\u00a0 A Google search for the term<\/a> showed its prior use but its prior use doesn’t seem all that widespread or significant.\u00a0 But “mentology” might be too general of a term to denote general semantics, so it might be proper to call general semantics “korzybskian mentology,” i.e., “the study of thinking from the perspective of Alfred Korzybski.”\u00a0 Not too attractive so maybe just stick to “mentology” whenever possible.<\/p>\n But we also have the interest in the effects of thinking, in particular on behavior, culture, and humanity.\u00a0 At this point I’m reminded of two things: Logic, and specifically Korzybski’s notion of “logical fate” (or what Bruce Kodish refers to as “psycho-logical fate”).<\/p>\n Just as much as the term “cognitive science,” the term “logic” might be used to mean “the study of thinking.”\u00a0 So in this respect, it might be nice to formulate an alternate term for general semantics that invokes the term “logic” over “-ology,” because it may more heavily focus on thinking.\u00a0 This would seem to make sense when we thinking of Korzybski’s (awesome) notion of logical fate.\u00a0 I don’t recall offhand if Korzybski invented the notion or borrowed it more or less directly from his pal Cassius Keyser (who\u00a0published Mathematical Philosophy:\u00a0 A Study of Fate and Freedom<\/em> around the same time Korzybski published Manhood of Humanity<\/em>), but the notion explains in diagrammatic form that particular conclusions are tied to particular assumptions, and one can’t arrive at other conclusions without changing to new assumptions.\u00a0 This wording suggests a deterministic correlation between particular assumptions and their respective conclusions, a point that might be hard to argue from a scientific perspective.\u00a0 It might be better to think that particular\u00a0conclusions are “destined” (a less determininistic term)\u00a0from particular\u00a0assumptions as opposed to “fated” (a more deterministic term).\u00a0 Then again, in terms of “the study of thinking and its effects on behavior, culture, and humanity,” we’re not really talking about either destiny or fate, only effects; we’re talking about “what happens” as opposed to “what should happen,” “what we should expect,” “what will happen,” etc.\u00a0 So we should probably avoid the terms “destiny” and “fate.”<\/p>\n Might we rename general semantics “causal logic”?\u00a0 Probably not because that term emphasizes cause more than effect, plus it seems to evoke discussion of the logic of causation more than “the study of thinking and its effects…”\u00a0 Well, what about “ecologic”?\u00a0 Wikipedia has this to say about ecology<\/a>:<\/p>\n Ecology<\/strong> […] is the interdisciplinary scientific study of the distributions, abundance and relations of organisms and their interactions with the environment.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n This definition of the term “ecology” seems to be\u00a0problematically vague in its invocation of the term “relations” (e.g., does ecology study the geometric relations of organisms and their interactions with the environment?).\u00a0 “Ecologic” or “ecologics”\u00a0might be appropriate alternate terms for general semantics were it not that\u00a0they evoke images of the environment more than thinking, so\u00a0they make general semantics seem a bit more like an environmental movement and its particular belief system.<\/p>\n But let’s follow this general train of thought around the word “logic.”\u00a0 Again, we turn to Wikipedia for what paths it might send us down.\u00a0 Cleaned up a bit, here’s the entry for “logic”<\/a>:<\/p>\n Logic <\/strong>[…]\u00a0is the study of reasoning.\u00a0 <\/sup>Logic is used in most intellectual activity, but is studied primarily in the disciplines of philosophy, mathematics, and computer science. Logic examines general forms which arguments may take, which forms are valid, and which are fallacies. It is one kind of critical thinking.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Here, logic is put in the perspective of critical thinking.\u00a0 That is, the general category is critical thinking, of which logic is just one kind of critical thinking.\u00a0 General semantics definitely falls into the category of critical thinking as well, though to identify (equate) the two would be a disservice to general semantics and a misrepresentation of critical thinking.\u00a0 Ultimately, critical thinking is one kind of behavior (“criticizing others’ thinking”), and so is general semantics, but criticizing others’ thinking\u00a0in a characteristic and specfic\u00a0way.<\/p>\n But maybe the term “critical semantics” would be a good alternate term for general semantics?\u00a0 What does that term sound like in context?\u00a0 Well, it brings to mind criticism, suggesting that what people do in the field is criticize … And it brings to mind semantics, which seems to bring to mind criticizing people’s word choices or maybe their meanings … If the latter is the case, I’m not a fan because it doesn’t imply criticizing people’s thinking and I feel it should.\u00a0 “Critical logic” might a possibility.\u00a0 Maybe?\u00a0 Maybe?<\/p>\n We are reminded of Korzybski’s discussion of “non-aristotelian systems,” i.e., his discussion of non-aristotelian logic.\u00a0 “Non-artistotelian logic” is basically Korzybski’s very general term for thinking that is out of line with current1933<\/sup> scientific understanding.\u00a0 “Critical logic” is perhaps the best candidate for an alternate term for general semantics so far in this post.\u00a0 But its drawback is its general sound.\u00a0 But then again, “non-aristotelian logic” is also a general term (though we tend not to think of it as general, but instead as quite specific).\u00a0 Hm.<\/p>\n Hm again.<\/p>\n I’m not sure how happy I would be with our field characterized in the negative, which is how the term “critical logic” seems to sound.\u00a0 It makes general semantics seem more destructive or damaging than constructive and helpful.\u00a0 Plus, we’re losing track of the second part of our definition, the “and its effects on behavior, culture, and humanity.”\u00a0 This second half reminds me of behavioral psychology and its emphases.\u00a0 Wikipedia has a lot to say about behavioral psychology.\u00a0 Actually, it redirects to behaviorism<\/a>.\u00a0 This redirect suggests an underlying belief system in behavioral psychology, a belief system which might be thought of as (from the “behaviorism” entry):<\/p>\n […] based on the proposition that all things that organisms do \u2014 including acting, thinking and feeling \u2014 can and should be regarded as behaviors.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n In terms of behavioral psychology, what we’d be studying in general semantics is the effect of one type of behavior (“thinking”) on other types of behaviors (“behavior, culture, and humanity”).\u00a0 Given that we probably need to emphasize thinking a bit more so it doesn’t get drowned by the general term “behavior,” maybe we’d alternately call general semantics “cognitive behavioral psychology”?\u00a0 We’re onto something, especially when we’re reminded just how much of an impact general semantics had on the development of different therapeutic approaches–cognitive behavioral therapy, rational emotive behavioral therapy, and presumably others.\u00a0 If we renamed the Institute of General Semantics to “The Institute of Cognitive Behavioral Psychology,” we’re probably doing general semantics a disservice because it would sound more like psychology than we would probably admit.<\/p>\n