{"id":1011,"date":"2010-12-24T10:16:18","date_gmt":"2010-12-24T15:16:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/?p=1011"},"modified":"2010-12-26T22:49:29","modified_gmt":"2010-12-27T03:49:29","slug":"generic-terms-and-their-relationship-with-truth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/2010\/12\/24\/generic-terms-and-their-relationship-with-truth\/","title":{"rendered":"Generic Terms and Their Relationship with Truth"},"content":{"rendered":"

When I say something terribly generic, I may make an incredibly true statement.\u00a0 Get me to make a more specific statement that’s true and I might find that I can’t do it.\u00a0 So what becomes the value of generic statements?\u00a0 What is truth in light of these observations?\u00a0 In continuing my ongoing general semantics discussion of language as generic<\/a>, let’s see.<\/p>\n

But first, let’s exemplify by giving you a generic, true statement:<\/p>\n

‘<\/span><\/div>

My name is Ben Hauck.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

A true statement, yes.\u00a0 But generic?\u00a0 “Generic” is a relative term, meaning that something may be generic from one vantage, but from the opposite vantage it may be specific.\u00a0 So I’ll offer up a more specific sentence to show the genericity<\/a> of my statement above:<\/p>\n

‘<\/span><\/div>

My name is Benito Hauck.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This second sentence is a more specific–i.e., less generic–statement.\u00a0 It is clueing you into my fuller name.\u00a0 In terms of what it specifies, it specifies that my longer name is “Benito,” which is more information than the name “Ben” reveals.<\/p>\n

So it’s a more specific statement, but is it still true?\u00a0 No.\u00a0 Because here’s a true statement that is also more specific:<\/p>\n

‘<\/span><\/div>

My name is Benjamin Hauck.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

My name isn’t<\/em> Benito.\u00a0 See how a more specific statement may be false while a\u00a0related generic statement may be true?<\/p>\n

This makes you wonder about science.\u00a0 If science deals with the manufacture of categorical propositions (as opposed to hypothetical propositions, distinctions made by Cassius Keyser in his fabulous book The Pastures of Wonder<\/a><\/em>), then its propositions (statements) bear a relative genericity (“they are relatively generic”), and the pursuit of science is to manufacture as specific a proposition as possible while also staying true<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Think of Zeno’s Paradox, which is explained popularly with a racing tortoise and hare.\u00a0 In the story, the tortoise moves slowly,\u00a0and the hare runs quickly, impaired in that he can only run half his distance every length.\u00a0 (So, when he runs half the race, he then runs a quarter, then an eighth, then a sixtheenth, and so on.)\u00a0 Theoretically, the hare never reaches the finish line and is beaten by the tortoise.<\/p>\n

Scientists are like hares, admitting that they can never achieve the finish line (seeing what “really” is there and thus knowing “Truth”), but believing they can get incredibly close to Truth.\u00a0 They make as specific a statement as possible that is true, but the statement always bears a genericity to it.\u00a0 Scientists, I’m arguing, are hopelessly generic, though they may be more specific than the layperson could ever be.<\/p>\n

I think Alfred Korzybski would argue something very similar.\u00a0 He would show his model, the Structural Differential<\/a>, and say that scientists can’t get beyond the object level of observation (the circle in the diagram) to see the event level (“what is going on,” as Samuel Bois called it).\u00a0 Their verbalizations may get close, but “no cigar.”\u00a0 Ever.<\/em><\/p>\n

Alfred, I wish I could have given you the word “generic.”\u00a0 I think it would have been a great teaching tool for you!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

When I say something terribly generic, I may make an incredibly true statement.\u00a0 Get me to make a more specific statement that’s true and I might find that I can’t do it.\u00a0 So what becomes the value of generic statements?\u00a0 What is truth in light of these observations?\u00a0 In continuing my ongoing general semantics discussion […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[94,252,36,249,128,248,254,236,253,255,81,77,250,70,256,257],"class_list":["post-1011","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general-semantics","tag-alfred-korzybski","tag-ben-hauck","tag-cassius-keyser","tag-categorical-propositions","tag-generic-terms","tag-genericity","tag-hypothetical-propositions","tag-language-as-generic","tag-relativity","tag-samuel-bois","tag-science","tag-structural-differential","tag-the-pastures-of-wonder","tag-truth","tag-wigo","tag-zenos-paradox"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1011","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1011"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1011\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1023,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1011\/revisions\/1023"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1011"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1011"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/benhauck.com\/offthemap\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1011"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}