Off the Map

Age old is probably the question that is the title for this post.  Despite its age, I haven’t wrestled with the question very much.  However, I find an interest in it as I’ve zeroed in on a marketable definition of general semantics.  In crafting a definition that really works, it casts new light on the label for the field and what its emphasis might be.  In light of that emphasis, you start to wonder if there’s a better term for the field …

I won’t go into some of the old candidates proposed for a new name, and instead just stick to some of my ideas.  As a starter, I’ll use my latest definition of general semantics, outlined in this post:

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General semantics is the study of thinking and its effects on behavior, culture, and humanity.

Shortened, you realize that general semantics is a study of thinking at its very root. Thus, the term “cognitive science” might be a nice term to use in its place, were it not already its own field.  Dictionary.com defines “cognitive science” as:

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the study of the precise nature of different mental tasks and the operations of the brain that enable them to be performed, engaging branches of psychology, computer science, philosophy, and linguistics.

This defintion puts general semantics generally within the field of cognitive science.  The only problem is that at times general semantics is a bit more editorial than scientific.  That is, rather than relying exclusively on evidence built up through scientific investigation as support for its claims, sometimes it relies on argued opinions for its claims.  My blog is the kind of support one might use in general semantics, considering that my claims aren’t rooted in the scientific method.

So, in that sense, the term “cognitive science” might be a bit too limiting an alternate term for general semantics, as general semantics might need something encompassing of it as scientific study as well as an editorial study.  Words ending in “-ology” start to come to mind, as that suffix generally means something to the effect of “the study of.”  If we’re talking about the study of thinking, the word “mental” comes to, um, mind.  “Mental” means “of or related to the mind,” and if you know from my published essay on the group mind, the word “mind” is a reification of the behavior of thinking.  So, just as much as “mental” means “of or related to the mind,” it means “of or related to thinking.”  We might try to rename general semantics, then, as mentology.

“Mentology” could be a nice term.  A Google search for the term showed its prior use but its prior use doesn’t seem all that widespread or significant.  But “mentology” might be too general of a term to denote general semantics, so it might be proper to call general semantics “korzybskian mentology,” i.e., “the study of thinking from the perspective of Alfred Korzybski.”  Not too attractive so maybe just stick to “mentology” whenever possible.

But we also have the interest in the effects of thinking, in particular on behavior, culture, and humanity.  At this point I’m reminded of two things: Logic, and specifically Korzybski’s notion of “logical fate” (or what Bruce Kodish refers to as “psycho-logical fate”).

Just as much as the term “cognitive science,” the term “logic” might be used to mean “the study of thinking.”  So in this respect, it might be nice to formulate an alternate term for general semantics that invokes the term “logic” over “-ology,” because it may more heavily focus on thinking.  This would seem to make sense when we thinking of Korzybski’s (awesome) notion of logical fate.  I don’t recall offhand if Korzybski invented the notion or borrowed it more or less directly from his pal Cassius Keyser (who published Mathematical Philosophy:  A Study of Fate and Freedom around the same time Korzybski published Manhood of Humanity), but the notion explains in diagrammatic form that particular conclusions are tied to particular assumptions, and one can’t arrive at other conclusions without changing to new assumptions.  This wording suggests a deterministic correlation between particular assumptions and their respective conclusions, a point that might be hard to argue from a scientific perspective.  It might be better to think that particular conclusions are “destined” (a less determininistic term) from particular assumptions as opposed to “fated” (a more deterministic term).  Then again, in terms of “the study of thinking and its effects on behavior, culture, and humanity,” we’re not really talking about either destiny or fate, only effects; we’re talking about “what happens” as opposed to “what should happen,” “what we should expect,” “what will happen,” etc.  So we should probably avoid the terms “destiny” and “fate.”

Might we rename general semantics “causal logic”?  Probably not because that term emphasizes cause more than effect, plus it seems to evoke discussion of the logic of causation more than “the study of thinking and its effects…”  Well, what about “ecologic”?  Wikipedia has this to say about ecology:

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Ecology […] is the interdisciplinary scientific study of the distributions, abundance and relations of organisms and their interactions with the environment.

This definition of the term “ecology” seems to be problematically vague in its invocation of the term “relations” (e.g., does ecology study the geometric relations of organisms and their interactions with the environment?).  “Ecologic” or “ecologics” might be appropriate alternate terms for general semantics were it not that they evoke images of the environment more than thinking, so they make general semantics seem a bit more like an environmental movement and its particular belief system.

But let’s follow this general train of thought around the word “logic.”  Again, we turn to Wikipedia for what paths it might send us down.  Cleaned up a bit, here’s the entry for “logic”:

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Logic […] is the study of reasoning.  Logic is used in most intellectual activity, but is studied primarily in the disciplines of philosophy, mathematics, and computer science. Logic examines general forms which arguments may take, which forms are valid, and which are fallacies. It is one kind of critical thinking.

Here, logic is put in the perspective of critical thinking.  That is, the general category is critical thinking, of which logic is just one kind of critical thinking.  General semantics definitely falls into the category of critical thinking as well, though to identify (equate) the two would be a disservice to general semantics and a misrepresentation of critical thinking.  Ultimately, critical thinking is one kind of behavior (“criticizing others’ thinking”), and so is general semantics, but criticizing others’ thinking in a characteristic and specfic way.

But maybe the term “critical semantics” would be a good alternate term for general semantics?  What does that term sound like in context?  Well, it brings to mind criticism, suggesting that what people do in the field is criticize … And it brings to mind semantics, which seems to bring to mind criticizing people’s word choices or maybe their meanings … If the latter is the case, I’m not a fan because it doesn’t imply criticizing people’s thinking and I feel it should.  “Critical logic” might a possibility.  Maybe?  Maybe?

We are reminded of Korzybski’s discussion of “non-aristotelian systems,” i.e., his discussion of non-aristotelian logic.  “Non-artistotelian logic” is basically Korzybski’s very general term for thinking that is out of line with current¹⁹³³ scientific understanding.  “Critical logic” is perhaps the best candidate for an alternate term for general semantics so far in this post.  But its drawback is its general sound.  But then again, “non-aristotelian logic” is also a general term (though we tend not to think of it as general, but instead as quite specific).  Hm.

Hm again.

I’m not sure how happy I would be with our field characterized in the negative, which is how the term “critical logic” seems to sound.  It makes general semantics seem more destructive or damaging than constructive and helpful.  Plus, we’re losing track of the second part of our definition, the “and its effects on behavior, culture, and humanity.”  This second half reminds me of behavioral psychology and its emphases.  Wikipedia has a lot to say about behavioral psychology.  Actually, it redirects to behaviorism.  This redirect suggests an underlying belief system in behavioral psychology, a belief system which might be thought of as (from the “behaviorism” entry):

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[…] based on the proposition that all things that organisms do — including acting, thinking and feeling — can and should be regarded as behaviors.

In terms of behavioral psychology, what we’d be studying in general semantics is the effect of one type of behavior (“thinking”) on other types of behaviors (“behavior, culture, and humanity”).  Given that we probably need to emphasize thinking a bit more so it doesn’t get drowned by the general term “behavior,” maybe we’d alternately call general semantics “cognitive behavioral psychology”?  We’re onto something, especially when we’re reminded just how much of an impact general semantics had on the development of different therapeutic approaches–cognitive behavioral therapy, rational emotive behavioral therapy, and presumably others.  If we renamed the Institute of General Semantics to “The Institute of Cognitive Behavioral Psychology,” we’re probably doing general semantics a disservice because it would sound more like psychology than we would probably admit.

The “-ism” approach might be interesting.  The suffix “-ism” seems to suggest a particular kind of belief system.  I think of two candidates offhand: “scientism” as well as “non-aristotelianism.”  The latter is actually a term in general semantics, but its specific meaning within general semantics makes it jargon, not to mention inducing of eye-blinking to the general public.  “Scientism” has a Wikipedia entry:

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The term scientism is used to describe the view that natural science has authority over all other interpretations of life, such as philosophical, religious, mythical, spiritual, or humanistic explanations, and over other fields of inquiry, such as the social sciences.

Well, this definitely works for general semantics, but like other candidate names, it suffers from being too general to be denotative.  Might a modifier aid it?  It seems to me that if one taught scientism, she’d teach some of the same notions taught in general semantics.  But in general semantics, if it’s to be seen as a study, we don’t just teach, or teach scientism, but we study unscientism, that is, we study unscientific beliefs as well as their effects.

I keep thinking, Damn, I wish I knew a prefix that meant “effects on”!

But wait.  When we talk about “meaning,” we use the word “semantics.”  But “meaning” has a handful of different meanings.  In one sense, it means something like “definition.”  But in another sense, it means something like “consequences.”  For an example, think of these sentences:

• “What does Obama’s signature mean for health care reform?”
• “So I’m HIV+.  What does that mean, doc?  How much longer do I have to live?”
• “What does global warming mean to sea creatures as well as human beings?”

In these example, “mean” essentially refers to “consequences.”  So does this meaning of “meaning” mean that the “semantics” in the term “general semantics” doesn’t have to do with words but instead with consequences?  Are the consequences of Obama’s signature considered “semantics”?  Is the projected lifespan of a person diagnosed with HIV considered “semantics”?  What about the welfare of creatures in light of global warming?  Are those “semantics” too?  Does “general semantics” means “general consequences”?

It seems to me they’d be semantics but not in the common use of the term.  So, again, problems.

But I tire not!  What about the word “mechanics”?  Might that term suggest consequences?  Maybe.  Consider this term: “cognitive mechanics.”  This term suggests the formulation of thoughts and the development of thinkings.  I sorta like the sound of it.  It seems to fit well with the definition of “the study of thinking and its effects on behavior, culture, and humanity.”  It even suggests that “the cognitive” can be manipulated.  Furthermore, as a term, it works in a complementary way with Korzybski’s name for his original field, human engineering (extra emphasis on “engineering”).  Maybe this alternate term for general semantics–“cognitive mechanics”–would serve the field of general semantics …

I wish I had access to Henry Head’s work on semantic aphasia, which had an influence on Korzybski’s coinage of the term for his discipline.  Or, I wish I had better understanding of Leon Chwistek’s mathematical works, which Korzybski also drew from … only I believe in their original Polish.  Those two lights might better reveal better the reasoning behind calling it “general semantics” and not, say, “flibberdygibbet.”  Which at this point might start to feel to me like as good a term as any.

See also: bruce-kodish, cognitive-mechanics, definition, marketing