Off the Map

It just struck me that the term “is of identity” misnamed what Korzybski warred against. Korzybski warred against identification, the behavior of confusing orders of abstraction. To sound a little bit less jargonic (a fun fake word, I think), the word “identification” labels the behavior of equating something that is abstract with something that is very detailed. It would be like confusing a mannequin for a real human being. While people don’t confuse mannequins for real human beings very often, they do confuse models for the actual things, or as Korzybski put it, they confuse maps for territories. It is this kind of behavior that Korzybski warred against, citing is as a primary source for people’s “unsanity.”

But then Korzybski went and got all “aristotelian.” In discussions of identification, he invoked the laws of thought associated with Aristotle. While identity is not discussed by Aristotle as a law of thought (from what I understand–I haven’t read the source material yet), it is apparently implied by his writings. Specifically, it goes something like this: “A is A.” I know that probably makes little sense to say, but apparently it is some really important logical “law” to have spelled out.

Korzybski called this “is” in that statement “the is of identity.” That seems fair to call it that. However, he then went on to war statements somewhat like this: “Ben is a man.” In this kind of statement, the word “Ben” represents something with a lot of characteristics, while the word “man” represents something of comparatively fewer characteristics. The “is” essentially equates these two different abstractions, making them as if they are interchangeable. As a result, we think we can talk about men and thus fully describe Ben. That’s a really problematic kind of speech, but it’s implied by that little word “is.”

But in my opinion (at least today), that little “is” is not an is of identity. It would be if it were in the sentence “Ben is Ben.” Maybe. But that kind of statement is kinda silly without a context. Instead, this is is identifying, or for a rough synonym, equating. The problematic behavior is identification.

From this, I glean we should call it “the is of identification.” That is much clearer to me. This “is” would be known as “the ‘is’ that identifies.” By talking about identity rather than identification, things get unnecessarily confusing, esp. when we start talking about brand identity or our own personal identity. For a long time, in general semantics, it basically seemed you couldn’t talk about one’s identity, so as a result, you started to end up with a marketing problem. (Marketing hinges on the development of identities–images, etc., that one associates with a brand.)

I want to toy with calling it “the is of identification” for a while to see if it fits a bit better, and becomes a better thing to teach. Post your own comments if you have a reaction to the above.

See also: identification, identity, is-of-identity, marketing